The Kengtung Question: Presbyterian Mission and Comity in Eastern Burma, 1896-1913

The LAOS MISSION of the Board of Foreign Missions, Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., located in northern Siam, was one of the most distant and least known of early twentieth century Presbyterian mission fields. Established in 1867 by Rev. Daniel McGilvary at Chiang Mai, the Laos Mission grew to include five stations by 1900. It was located in the extensive, remote northern region of Siam the inhabitants of which being known as the "Laos." The Presbyterian Board was the sole mission agency working this difficult mission field.1

Given the remoteness of the Laos Mission and the absence of other mission bodies in its region, the Mission was an unlikely candidate for a comity dispute. However, the Mission's recognized territory in northern Siam bordered on territory in British Burma that had yet to be occupied by missionaries at the turn of the century. Kengtung State was a siren call impossible for Presbyterian missionaries with a penchant for moving frontiers to ignore. As it developed, the venerable American Baptist Burma Mission had also expanded its work to the borders of Kengtung State. Its missionaries were equally attracted to expanding mission boundaries.2 Thus, conditions were ripe for what became known as "The Kengtung Question," a Presbyterian-Baptist dispute on the northern border of Siam and British Burma.

The purpose of this article is to examine certain Presbyterian missionary ideals in the light of the events in Kengtung. Those events clearly highlight principles of expansion and restraint in Presbyterian missions within the context of financial, policy, and personality realities. The article is divided into two sections: a narrative of events; and, secondly, an analysis of those events.

The roots of the Kengtung Question began with an exploratory tour taken by McGilvary and the Reverend Robert Irwin into Kengtung State in 1893. That trip was a benchmark because it opened a new horizon for the Laos Mission. Men such as Irwin were forcefully impressed with the potential of the Kengtung field.3 Indeed, Irwin quickly took the lead in pressing the Board to occupy Kengtung State. By 1896, he could hardly contain himself and was clearly unhappy with the Board for its lack of initiative. He even went so far as to propose that he be allowed to go into Kengtung at his own expense if the Board had no plans to occupy the field. Irwin expressed the rationale behind Presbyterian occupancy when he said that the Presbyterian Church had a special responsibility in Kengtung because the people there were "Laos" similar to the people in northern Siam.4

Presbyterian work began in Kengtung State in 1896 when the Laos Mission sent two colporteur parties into the State. The following year, two members of the Chiang Rai Station, Rev. William C. Dodd and Dr. William A. Briggs, made another exploratory trip to Kengtung. They met Irwin, who was returning from furlough via Rangoon, at Kengtung. It was from him that they learned for the first time that the Baptists had firm plans to occupy Kengtung themselves. Irwin felt that Baptist occupancy would preclude opening a Presbyterian station. Dodd and Briggs did not.5

The shadowy outlines of an emerging Presbyterian-Baptist controversy began to appear in the next few years. Dr. Briggs wrote to Dr. Arthur Judson Brown, Secretary of the Board, that no thought should be given to turning Kengtung over to the Baptists. They were totally unequipped for the task of evangelizing that field. An 1898 Baptist position paper led to the first direct contacts between the Burma and Laos Missions. Dodd met a Dr. Henderson at Kengtung: Dodd was uncertain just how fruitful this meeting was and he could only hope that Kengtung would be handled in a sensible, brotherly fashion.6 By 1900, a tone of bitterness began to creep into the affair. In answering a Baptist statement of their position regarding Kengtung, Dr. Briggs branded the statement as being filled with generalities, ignorant on basic points, and difficult to take seriously.7

There were other problems as well regarding the Presbyterian occupation of Kengtung. Both the Board and the Laos Mis-
sion were facing serious financial restraints to the point that by 1900 financial limitations were a more serious factor in preventing occupancy that was the comity dispute. Because of these financial considerations there was opposition within the Laos Mission itself to immediate occupation of Kengtung. At the same time, the Board had growing commitments in other places that competed with Kengtung both for attention and for money. Serious political disturbances erupted in north Siam in 1902, and these events effectively distracted the Mission from all other issues including Kengtung.

Thus, the question of Presbyterian development of a Kengtung Station was problematic in any event. It was greatly complicated by the fact of actual Baptist occupancy which began in 1901. All of the various factors of sectarian differences, finances, and politics seemed to argue against Kengtung. In this light, Board approval for a Kengtung Station, given in May, 1903, came as a surprise. Approval must be attributed in part to the forceful personality of William C. Dodd who was home on furlough at that time. The Dodds were appointed to the new station along with the Reverend C. R. Callender family.

The news of the opening of Kengtung was not greeted with universal enthusiasm even in the Laos Mission. Dr. C. H. Denman, Secretary of the Laos Mission, expressed a cautious joy but urged that the weakness of the Mission at that time precluded any immediate move to open the station. Denman felt that his was a widely held opinion on the field, and Rev. J. H. Freeman, normally an enthusiastic Mission expansionist, agreed. Freeman noted that allowing the Dodds and Callenders to take up new work would seriously cripple existing activities unless replacements were found for them. Dodd was not to be deterred. His enthusiasm for the new station was sufficient to garner some $6,000 in pledges for the Kengtung Station. Even better, while on furlough, he helped to find a physician for the new station, Dr. Howard Cornell.

The Dodds and the Cornells left San Francisco on 31 October 1903. They had a comparatively easy trip back to the field, finally arriving in Kengtung on 15 April 1904. Dodd's first letter from the new field was brimming with that same enthusiasm. He noted that the new station was being well-received in Kengtung by all segments of the population. The Presbyterian missionaries lost no time in beginning to plant their new station. Within six weeks they secured a temporary site for the station and began erecting their homes. Dr. Cornell found his medical skills in immediate demand. The first converts were won and prospects for others were bright. Best of all, the Baptists seemed to be entirely reconciled to the Presbyterians and even invited them to use Baptist chapel facilities for evangelistic services. The Reverend William Young, senior Baptist missionary at Kengtung, was reported to be very "fraternal" in his attitude, and relations were so good that a union prayer service was begun. In early September, Dodd was able to report that all members of the station were in good health and that the material development of the station was rapid. It was in that same month of September, that the Callender family arrived in Rangoon on their way north to reinforce the station. They reported being very kindly received by the Baptist mission community in Rangoon. Things seemed to be going well.

However, by the end of September Dodd was pressed to write to Brown that, "We are in such trouble as we never had in our lives." Dodd and Dr. Cornell had begun to argue bitterly. Cornell had already gone over to work with the Baptists and was following their increasingly vocal line that the Presbyterians should get out of Kengtung. The points of conflict between Dodd and Cornell were petty, being related to Cornell's unstable and explosive temper. The work of the Station was greatly disrupted. Matters continued to deteriorate until, finally, the Callenders arrived in mid-December, 1904. With their arrival, things improved temporarily as Dr. Cornell settled down and returned, or so it seemed, to the Presbyterian fold.

The Dodd-Cornell falling out had serious repercussions on mission relations in Kengtung. Dodd reported that Cornell had gone a long way towards sowing mistrust between Young, a man of narrow vision and deep-seated prejudices, and the Presbyterians. In early 1905, a year after Presbyterian arrival, the two sides exchanged pointed letters stating their respective positions on Kengtung. At the same time, Dodd and Callender sent a further statement to Dr. Brown in New York City.

The letter to Brown deserves special mention as it presents a clear statement of the issues in question. First of all, the letter summarized the ethnic and linguistic arguments for Presbyterian occupancy. That is, the people in Kengtung were much more closely related to the "Laos" of northern Siam than to the so-called Shans, the people the Baptists worked with in their Shan Mission south of Kengtung. Dodd and Callender argued that even authorities cited by Young actually agreed with the Presbyterian ethno-linguistic position. Secondly, Dodd and Callender presented further evidence to show that the Buddhist faith of Kengtung more closely approximated that of northern Siam than it did other regions of Burma proper. The Presbyterians then went on to show that the Laos Mission was better equipped to handle the Kengtung work. Only its press could produce literature usable there. They also argued that the Baptists did not respect Pres-
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Protestant territory even in Siam itself and were raiding Presbyterian converts. Thus, Kengtung should be established as a forward base to protect the Laos Mission. Dodd and Callender closed their letter with a ringing affirmation of Presbyterian responsibility for the people of Kengtung. It was only Young’s willingness that prevented them from carrying out God’s call to them.25

An important moment was reached in December, 1905. Following established Laos Mission procedures, the Kengtung Station had been opened only on a trial basis. The mission annual meeting of 1905 was to decide its fate, and for two full days the entire attention of the assembled missionaries was given over to Kengtung.26 There were sharp differences of opinion with perhaps as much as half the Mission against continued joint Baptist-Presbyterian occupancy of the station. A compromise was suggested whereby the Station would be removed to a promising center in eastern Kengtung State so that tensions with the Baptists could be reduced. Dodd rejected this compromise and argued that only in Kengtung City could the Station fully carry out its responsibilities to the people. The ace up Dodd’s sleeve was a thinly veiled threat that the Dodds and Callenders would go back to the United States if the Mission moved or shut down the Kengtung Station. Sharply divided over Kengtung and faced with the loss of two senior families, the Mission finally decided that, instead of voting for permanent occupation of Kengtung, it would vote for continued occupation.27

The depth of controversy generated at the 1905 annual meeting was demonstrated in another decision taken by the Mission. Previous to this meeting the Board had agreed with the Baptist Union that a Joint Commission should be appointed on the field to study and resolve the Kengtung problem. The Laos Mission was to have appointed two mission members to that commission at the 1905 annual meeting. However, the pro-Kengtung forces were able to block the appointments and the potential dangers of such a commission by arguing that it was certain to fail. Dr. Denman expressed bitterness over this thwarting of the Board’s will; and, eventually, the Board had to order the Mission to make the appointments.28

The 1905 meeting was not a victory for Dodd in spite of appearances. The Mission was coerced by the threats of resignation into passing a half-measure that was unpopular and that left the Station in limbo. Furthermore, the doubters were not convinced of the wisdom of a Kengtung Station. The greatly respected McGillivray noted that no one in the Mission doubted the right of the Presbyterians to be in Kengtung, but they did question the wisdom of joint occupancy. It was accepted that the Baptists had a right to be in Kengtung. The Kengtung apologists failed to demonstrate a greater need for Presbyterian occupation. It was a disastrous failure. Equally disastrous was the rejection by Dodd of the compromise suggestion of moving the Station. Such a move would have won over to the Kengtung side supporters while creating greater mission unity. It might have won the permanent occupation of Kengtung State.29 A critical moment passed. If any one moment was the point at which Kengtung was “lost” it was this pyrrhic victory when Dodd won a battle but failed to alter the course of the war.

Despite all of the heat and controversy generated by the missions comity issue, the Kengtung Station did achieve some progress in its overall work. In 1905, it opened a school, began construction on a bazaar chapel, and won more than ten converts.30 In the following year, it established a formal church and continued to improve its physical plant and the size of the Christian community. 1906 was, in fact, the only year during which the Kengtung Station functioned as a stable mission enterprise.31

The next year, 1907, was less happy. Early in that year the Kengtung Joint Commission met for a period of thirty days. Presbyterian members of the commission were Dr. S. C. Peoples and the Reverend Howard Campbell, both Kengtung advocates. As predicted, the commission failed to resolve the issues at stake. What was agreed by all four commissioners was that the Kengtung field was too small for joint occupancy. This decision was fateful. It meant that whoever worked in Kengtung must be willing to work with all ‘ethnic’ groups throughout the field.32

The commission and its work further weakened the Kengtung Station in another way: when the Presbyterian members left Kengtung they asked Dodd to gather together all of the data and write the report they were to send to the Board. This task took up most of Dodd’s time in 1907 and had a debilitating effect on his health. Station work lapsed. Callender could not help as he was laboring under the Station’s medical responsibilities—work for which he had no training. In fact, the physical and mental health of the Station deteriorated throughout the year until by the end of 1907 the Callenders resigned feeling totally exhausted and bitter towards the Board. The uncertainty of the status of the Station because of the sectarian dispute coupled with all of the “normal” pressures of a distant field ruined their health and drained away their commitment to Kengtung.33

In the meantime, the scene of the Kengtung Question had shifted to the United States. Peoples and Campbell of the Joint Commission asked Dr. Briggs, home on furlough, to take responsibility for presenting their report (written by Dodd) to the Board.34 The report was closely studied. Briggs was given a hearing by the Board. The Laos Committee and the Executive Com-
mittee of the Board met together to prepare recommendations for the future of the Station. A summary of those recommendations suggests the futility of the Station's situation. The two committees, first of all, noted that the Joint Commission had agreed that only one Mission should work in Kengtung. This meant that the Board would either have to take all of Kengtung or pull out entirely. There was no middle ground left. Secondly, it was noted that the Baptists were eager to work in Kengtung and willing to take full responsibility there. Thirdly, the Board had not been able to collect on the pledges for money given to Dodd in 1903 so that the whole burden of Kengtung had fallen directly on the Board. Fourthly, the Board was laboring under very heavy debts and obligations. Finally, the Laos Mission was itself underdeveloped while at the same time the Board needed to press highly promising work in other parts of East Asia. Given these few considerations, the two committees agreed that the Board could not itself take full responsibility for Kengtung. It could not replace Baptist work. It would violate the spirit of comity to continue arguing over such a small field when so much needed to be done elsewhere. Therefore, the two committees recommended that Kengtung be abandoned.\(^5\)

The full Board met in November, 1907, and it took the actions recommended by its committees. The Dodds were notified that they would have to leave Kengtung. It was a bitter pill, and Dodd would later write about how stunned they were to hear the news. Their workers, their converts, and all of the people of Kengtung were saddened by this Board decision. However, in the early months of 1908, the Dodds made the necessary arrangements for closing the station including selling the property to the Baptists. By June they were back at their old station in Chiang Rai.\(^6\)

For a full decade the Kengtung Question had been a troublesome, distracting issue both for the Laos Mission and for the Board of Foreign Missions. The closing of the Station should have been the end of the controversy. It wasn't. The 1907 Board resolution closing the Station failed to resolve two key points. First of all, according to that resolution the Board continued to assert its right to work in Kengtung State if future conditions made it wise to return. Dodd was elated at this statement for it seemed that even though the Board ordered a withdrawal from Kengtung, it was finally willing to acknowledge its obligations and rights there. Secondly, the Board resolution failed to state clearly whether or not Presbyterian work in Kengtung was to be fully suspended. Dodd saw in this silence a mandate to continue the work in Kengtung as an outstation of Chiang Rai Station. The Dodds actively pursued this course by sending Mission elders on trips into the State and by taking, in 1909, an extensive tour of the State themselves.\(^7\)

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It was Dr. Briggs who reignited the Kengtung Question by suggesting that Dodd make an extended tour of the Tai-speaking regions of southern China while on his way home for furlough. Taking up the suggestion, Dodd set off in 1910 on one of the most remarkable journeys of Presbyterian missionary history. In six months of arduous, dangerous travelling, he went from Chiang Rai in northern Siam to Kengtung and then northward into Yunnan Province, China. Then he headed east for Canton on the coast. It was a thousand mile trip into some of the most remote areas of Asia.\(^8\)

This amazing trip became for Dodd and his Kengtung cohorts an equally vivid propaganda coup. The journey stirred the imagination of the Board in a way that the reams of reports and correspondence on Kengtung had never done. In February, 1911, Dodd addressed the whole Board. He told them that the Tai-speaking peoples of China numbered some twelve to sixteen millions. Their language was surprisingly similar to that spoken in northern Siam. There were no missions working this vast field. The people were eager for missionaries who spoke their language to come and work with them. Based on Dodd's tour and other tours taken into Indo-China during the same period, the Board adopted in March, 1911, a resolution expressing its renewed interest in expanding its mission to the Tai peoples wherever they might be found.\(^9\) Nothing was said about Kengtung, but it was clear that Dodd and the others had not forgotten their desire to make it the first step in expansion into China.

Previously, the Kengtung group had emphasized the importance of Kengtung as a residence of a large "Laos" population. After the Dodd journey of 1910, the Kengtung supporters began to emphasize its strategic value as a "gateway" into the larger Tai-speaking regions of China. A Laos Mission cable dated July, 1911, expressed the unanimous support of the Mission for reopening Kengtung as a gateway to northern expansion. After receiving this cable, Dr. Brown approached the Baptists about the possibility of Presbyterian reoccupation of Kengtung. The reaction was bluntly negative. Young and the Baptist Mission levelled stinging broadsides at the renewed Presbyterian pretensions. Young wrote in bitter, barbed, and personal tones about Dodd. Presbyterian replies and rebuttals of Baptist charges were only slightly more gentlemanly. The essential position of each side had not changed since 1905.\(^10\)

There was little action, however. This was partly a matter of the painfully slow pace of mail in those years. It was also partly a function of the slowness with which the Laos Mission responded to Baptist assertions and charges. And as the months dragged by, the Board became less and less enthusiastic about either the greater Tai mission or the opening of Kengtung. This
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same time, the carrot of Yunnan was dangled before them. The expansionists now had an officially sanctioned, Baptist approved mandate to go into southern China.43

II

It is often easier to discover and to account for the historical forces at work in a failure than in success. The Kengtung Question offers a case in point. Had Dodd and the others been successful in Kengtung, it is unlikely that the base of their motivations and the wellsprings of their behaviour would be so sharply noticeable. Five major factors may be isolated and identified as contributing significantly to the development of the Kengtung Question. Each of these factors is closely related to the others and yet each exerts its own independent pull.

The Call to Kengtung. In attempting to understand why the Kengtung Question arose as it did, we must begin with the nature of the call that the Kengtung missionaries felt. Irwin, Briggs, and Dodd shared a common perception that God was calling them into Kengtung just as God had called Paul to go over to Macedonia. They believed that only they could properly fulfill this calling and thus were burdened with a heavy responsibility. Time and again they stated their longing to be about what they perceived to be God's work for them. They went to Kengtung not out of sectarian concern nor for personal advantage but because they believed God called them.44

The Kengtung expansionists were in no way unusual for their time. The writings of Robert E. Speer reflected the same understanding of the missionary calling. He wrote, "It is our duty to carry Christianity to the world because the world needs to be saved, and Christ alone can save it."45 This was precisely the faith of Dodd and the others. Nor was the Macedonian call motif unique to them. James S. Dennis, a Presbyterian missionary in Syria, gave a series of lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1893 in which he analyzed Paul's Macedonian call and commented that, "It was also suggestive and typical of a permanent call, just as real and direct, to the Church in all ages to discharge the duty of missionary service wherever similar conditions existed."46 In his list of contemporary Macedonian calls, Dennis noted the calling of the Laos Mission to work in southern China.47 Ideologically, the Kengtung expansionists were in the mainstream of Presbyterian mission thinking. The power of that thinking should not be underestimated. God's call to mission was perceived by the missionaries as being an ultimate concern touching the heart of their lives. It was a powerful force for motivation.
The Dodd group strongly believed that God’s call to them was confirmed in actual events. They perceived the work of Providence in the things that happened to them. When Dodd had a safe and relatively easy trip from the United States to Kengtung in 1903-1904, he attributed the fact to Providence. As he prepared for his 1910 China trip, he outlined nine ways in which Providence was leading the Board through events to reopen Kengtung. Even when the Kengtung movement experienced setbacks, such as the troubles with Dr. Cornell, Dodd was able to see the humbling, chastising hand of God at work. In every event, good and bad, the call of God was revealed as valid. The depth of this Call also shaped the Kengtung group’s understanding of the field itself. They saw its great promise as being a further sign of God’s call to them. It showed that Providence was calling the Presbyterians to Kengtung. When local rulers in Kengtung and the local people of the State responded favorably to the work of the missionaries and expressed their appreciation of that work, Dodd could immediately interpret this as yet a further proof of God’s calling to Kengtung.

Analytically, this deeply felt sense of God’s call was an expansionist doctrine. Its dynamic pushed the missionary into new fields. At the same time, it was strong force of motivation based on convictions and resulting in a form of inner tension: a tension between the limitations of a given situation and the convictional pressures of God’s call. Every event at Kengtung was interpreted through the eyes of faith. However, these deep convictions were not only a strength but also became a serious weakness. All events must be testimony to God’s call. No event could contradict or call that fact into question. Compromise under such conditions became nearly impossible because these convictions were so deeply held. Thus, at the heart of the Kengtung Question was the fact that two equally committed sides both felt that God was calling them to be the principal evangelistic force in Kengtung. The belief in God’s Call held by both sides resulted in a conflict, and this conflict of expansionist convictions provided the central dynamic for the Kengtung Question.

The Principle of Comity. The principle of comity was a necessary corollary to the belief in the call to missions. Without some principle of compromise the result of conflicting calls could produce chaos. Thus, there was a need for a principle of restraint to limit zealous pursuit of expansion and to channel the ideal of God’s call into cooperative rather than competitive ventures.

As far as Dodd and Briggs were concerned in the particular case of Kengtung, it was unfortunate that the Board of Foreign Missions was particularly dedicated to the ideal of missionary comity. When Kengtung became such an issue, the pro-Kengtung group could not attack the principle of comity directly. Instead, they had to try to shift the whole issue of Kengtung away from comity and show that it was not really involved. At one time, they tried to warn that while comity was good it could be overridden. At another time, they argued that it should not be a consideration because the Baptists themselves did not observe the rules of comity. On several occasions, the Kengtung group stated bluntly that Kengtung was not a matter of principle but rather of personalities. All of these arguments proved to be unsuccessful. Comity remained a central issue in the Kengtung Question.

Thus, the pro-Kengtung Presbyterians were forced to develop their “side” of the issue even as they tried to argue that comity was not involved. It was a difficult situation. In dealing with this problem, the Kengtung group worked out an ingenious scheme: they backed away from the usual geographic definition of inter-mission boundaries and argued instead for an ethnolinguistic definition. Dodd wrote, “The lines which demarcate our work are linguistic and racial, not geographical or civil.” The purpose was to then argue that only the Presbyterians of the Laos Mission could speak the language of the people in Kengtung and only they understood the Buddhist culture of Kengtung well enough to work effectively in the State.

In short, the Presbyterian missionaries were attempting to redefine the rationale by which a mission field was occupied. The crucial factor was not that a particular territory had been untended. The central concern was that a certain ethnic group had only been partially evangelized. They were saying, then, that the Laos Mission was not called to a territory but to a people. On this ground, it could then be asserted that Kengtung was already a part of the Laos Mission “field.”

Two problems emerged. In the first place, the Baptists never really accepted the ethnolinguistic definition of the Kengtung field. They felt that the Presbyterians were exaggerating ethnic differences. They also felt competent to handle all the various tribal and flat land groups in the State. Thus, on the face of it, the Presbyterian claim appeared weaker. The Presbyterians were primarily interested in only one Kengtung group, even though they claimed it to be the majority of the State and even though they occasionally insisted they cared for other groups as well. The Baptist claim was not nearly so clouded.

Dodd, Briggs, and the others might have weathered this first problem. The Presbyterian claim was not entirely ethnolinguistic nor the Baptist claim entirely geographic. It was all a matter of degrees. But they found their arguments neutralized by two fateful decisions: the 1906 Board agreement to submit Kengtung to arbitration if necessary, and the 1907 Joint Commission agree-
ment that Kengtung was only large enough for one mission. As has already been noted, these two decisions forced the Presbyterian supporters of Kengtung into a no-win situation. They could not press their ethnic and linguistic points to advantage. They had never really intended to demand sole possession of the field, and even Dodd himself had openly acknowledged the Baptist’s capable work among hill tribes in Kengtung. But these two agreements focused on geographical considerations, and the Baptists gained a great advantage because their central rationale for moving into Kengtung was that the State was a logical territorial extension of their earlier work.

It is worth noting in retrospect that the Presbyterians actually were more correct in their views on the Kengtung field. From later Baptist sources, it is clear that the Baptists could no more fully occupy the Kengtung field than could the Presbyterians and that Baptist work was almost entirely limited to hill tribes. The Baptists had very little success among the “Shans” of Kengtung (i.e. the “Laos”) except for a very modest Christian group in Muang Yawng, where the work had been started by Dodd. The Presbyterians had a more realistic view of the Kengtung situation primarily because they were correct in their statements that they knew the religion and language of the people better than did the Baptists. It is ironic that the Baptists won the field on the basis of a stronger theoretical claim but then showed that realistically their ability to work the field had been no stronger than that of the Presbyterians. The geographical argument provided the stronger claim to Kengtung but proved to be no more realistic for actual mission work.

It is difficult, then, to say whether or not comity provided an effective restraint upon conflicting perceptions of God’s call in this case. In one sense, it was quite effective as a restraint on abuse of mission expansionist principles. It was clearly a reason for the Board’s withdrawing from Kengtung in 1907 and refusing to return in 1913. Yet, one searches with little success the records of Kengtung for the spirit of comity that would have allowed both parties a portion of the field. The sense of cooperation between the two parties was limited and fragile from the beginning. It is unlikely that the comity principle would have been given much attention if matters had been left in the hands of the Presbyterian missionaries on the field. Comity was a central issue because of the Board’s commitment to the principle. The Limits of Resources. Kengtung was not, however, a simple matter of interaction between the principles of call and comity. The situation was greatly complicated by the limits of the financial and human resources of both the Board and the Laos Mission. At every key point in the development of events, these limitations were an important factor influencing all decisions.

The problem of resources affected the Kengtung Question at two levels: At the first level, there was the problem of the weak condition of the Mission itself. At the second level, there were the strained resources of the Board. Throughout the period of the Kengtung Question, the Laos Mission was inherently weak. The unhealthy state of the Mission was one of the strongest points causing opposition to opening or reopening the Kengtung Station. Opposition to Kengtung in the Mission was always stated in practical, immediate, and contextual terms. The “moment” was not right. As late as 1912-1913, respected senior members of the Mission continued to hold serious doubts about the practical matters of timing and finances and personnel in relation to reopening the Kengtung work. The local problems of the Laos Mission were greatly compounded by the pressing needs of the worldwide mission of the Board. The litany of China, Korea, Philippines appears again and again in the Kengtung literature. The Board keenly felt its call to those more accessible, more populous, and more influential East Asian fields. The Board believed that it had greater opportunity to influence the course of world events in those areas.

The Kengtung group failed to find a solution to the issues of finances and personnel just as they failed to cope with comity. They were reduced, in the end, to decrying the injustice of it all and regretting the stringent policies of the Board. With characteristic vim and bluntness, Dr. Briggs wrote:

Is this LAOS business too big for American Presbyterians? It begins to look like it. There is no use talking about the good times a coming. American Presbyterians have more money now than their just share; head for head; they also have more brains head for head; they also have bigger men in the ministry, man for man; than other less favored groups of mankind. I think that the trouble has been in not making Laos BIG ENOUGH.

In Briggs’ estimation, Kengtung was partly a matter of public relations and fund raising. He saw it as a matter of moving Laos Missions (including Kengtung) to the forefront of Presbyterian thinking and attention. But the Kengtung forces were never able to do that. Neither by complaining nor by strategy could they move kengtung out of the backwater nor generate substantial funding for it.

The Kengtung expansionists were caught in a no-win situation. Comity and resources were a combination that worked wholly against them and just as one seemed solved, the other reared an ugly head. It was Briggs who gave voice to this essential dilemma when he demanded of Arthur J. Brown some determinable Board policy about Kengtung. Briggs acutely observed that every time the Kengtung people went to the Board for money, the Board said that the comity issue had to be solved first. And
when the Board was pressed to resolve comity differences, the Board responded that little could be done anyway because there was not enough money. Briggs’s observation was true but not nearly as paradoxical as he thought. The Board dared not invest too much in Kengtung until the comity matter was cleared up. At the same time, it could not press the Baptists on comity because the Board did not have the resources needed to set up a fully viable station in Kengtung.

Resource limitations proved to be a parallel to the principle of missions comity in the Kengtung Question. Where comity functioned as an ethical discipline to missionary expansion, resource limitations provided a practical brake to expansion. These two considerations, ethical and practical, worked in tandem to keep mission expansion within proper and manageable bounds.

The Problem of Personalities. While impersonal forces and conflicting ideologies played their part in the Kengtung Question, the human element was both very real and very much a factor in events. Dodd and the others argued that the Kengtung Question was really only a matter of personalities, more specifically, the personality of Mr. Young. They felt that if Young were removed from the scene, all of the issues of comity would be removed. In one sense, the Presbyterians were not far wide of the mark. Young was a man with a flinty personality much given to controversy. He was dogmatic in his opinions and uncompromising in his relationships. It is little wonder that the Presbyterians found him to be so personally distasteful. However, the position that his personality was the main cause of the Kengtung Question does not hold. Even “good” Baptists such as Dr. Gibbens, Baptist physician in Kengtung, held views on Kengtung similar to those of Young. Senior members of the Baptist Mission, committees of that Mission, and the Baptist Union all consistently backed him. The force of Young’s personality was a major factor in the development of events, but the issues at stake went much deeper than just the flinty personality of one man.

In much the same manner, the personality of Dodd played an important role in the Kengtung Question. As events showed, he never lost a hardheaded, uncompromising determination to establish a station at Kengtung. He could be ruthless, devious, and insensitive in pursuit of that single goal which he so deeply felt to be God’s call to him. Much the same could be said of the colorful, forthright Briggs and the self-involved Callender. Comments by Young and other Baptists suggest that they felt the same dislike for Dodd and other Presbyterians as the Presbyterians felt for some of them. Thus, a personality type emerges that was common to both sides and that was a factor in events. These missionaries were strong-willed individuals, devout to a fault, certain of their calling, impatient with barriers, and willing to fight for their convictions of the right. They were brave individuals with high ideals, but they could fuss and feud in the gutter of sectarianism over those ideals.

The root cause of the Baptist-Presbyterian personality clashes does not seem, however, to have been the fact that the protagonists displayed certain similar character traits. Despite the fact that Dodd, Briggs, and the others denied they were sectarian and argued that the Kengtung Question was a matter of Baptist “personalities” and not denominational differences, the truth was that there did develop bitter sectarian feeling. This was not the intention of either side as the joint prayer meetings and fraternal feelings of the early months of Presbyterian occupancy in 1904 showed. Both sides tried to get along. But in reality the Presbyterians, for their part, were convinced of the superiority of their church and missions system. They castigated the Baptist missionary system for not being able to control a man such as Young. They resented the Baptists rebaptizing Presbyterian converts. They felt that the Baptists “stole” work from them, used duplicity, and acted in unseemly and obstinate ways. In terms of ultimate ends, Dodd and the others firmly believed that it was the Presbyterian Church that represented the will of God in Kengtung and that the Baptists were thwarting God’s will by opposing the Presbyterians.

In sum, sectarian differences resulted in personality conflicts rather than the other way around. We see here one reason why missions comity was a necessary principle: disputes over territory could quickly descend into sectarian and personality quarrels that wasted time and embittered people who were supposed to be working to the same ends. We may also observe that the problem of personality was in part a function of the principle of the Macedonian call. That call was from God. It was an ultimate. Its great ends made compromise excruciatingly difficult and justified means that might otherwise be questionable. This rich mix of call and personality further complicated and enlivened the Kengtung Question.

Board and Mission Politics. The core of the Kengtung Question was in the meaning and the application of the principles of the Macedonian call and of missionary comity. Matters of finances and personality further complicated the issue. But the question as to why this mixture of principles and realities failed to result in a permanent Kengtung Station is a political question. It may be said that the Kengtung Station failed because the political formula was unstable. The combination of principles, people, and priorities resulted in failure.

We have already noted how the Dodd group attempted to influence the Board to gain its support. The group failed in those attempts. Thus, one of the marks of the Kengtung literature is a
tension between the Board and the Kengtung advocates. At one
time, Dodd actually charged the Board with being “criminus par-
ticips” with the Baptists in withholding the Gospel from the
“Laos” peoples of Kengtung. Dodd showed little sensitivity to
the problems facing the Board in this case, but he did express
the agonized frustration of missionaries who could not convince
the Board with their own convictions. This failure was key to the
Kengtung Question. The question was lost in the Presbyterian
Board as Young always had strong backing from all levels on the
Baptist side. Young could attack from strength knowing that he
could not himself be dislodged from Kengtung. He and his sup-
porters were able to carry the attack to the Board of Foreign
Missions and create uncertainty there. Dodd and company were
never able to come off of a defensive position.

The political failure of the Kengtung people began in their
failure to win the wholehearted support of their own Mission.
That Mission was more open to manipulation by them. In 1905,
Dodd used threats to secure the continuation of the Station. In
1911, Briggs used similar threats to get Mission approval for re-
questing the reopening of Kengtung. These tactics proved self-
defeating. They won no hearts. The total result was that Dodd
and company failed to effect the political changes necessary to
win a Kengtung Station. They might have been much more suc-
cessful if they had framed their problems and tactics in terms of
politics rather than principles. By doing so, they might have com-
plained to and about the Board less. They might have moved
more quickly for compromises. They might have found the tactics
of threat less appealing. Yet, again, we must credit that they were
carried in a very difficult position: they gave their principles ul-
timate significance while they were in a situation in which they
could live out those principles only by compromising them. The
Kengtung literature is quite clear in demonstrating that Dodd,
Briggs, Callender, and others could not compromise on the mat-
ter of God’s call to Kengtung.

□ □ □

The Kengtung Question may be viewed from any number of
perspectives. The one chosen here is the interaction between
missionary principles and situational realities. The Kengtung
Question, in this light, is a study in the power of ideals and the
practical limits on them. It suggests that even the best ideals and
the highest motivations can become twisted and tangled in the
muddier waters of human affairs.

Firmly held convictions in the case of Kengtung were not
effective in attaining the ends desired by them. People of faith
and principle found themselves trapped in a sectarian dispute
that curtailed effective mission work in Kengtung. It is also cu-
rious how irrelevant those principles showed themselves to be
in the lives of the people of Kengtung State. Convictions about
church polity, comity, mission boundaries, methods of baptism,
terms for church membership, conflicting calls, and the other
issues that divided Baptist from Presbyterian had nothing to do
with the religious needs of those people. Missionaries on both
sides of the issue became the victims of their own convictions
and were blinded to spiritual realities in northern Burma and to
the practical realities of their own situation.

Nevertheless, we must also realize that the principles of call
and comity did function, if belatedly and haphazardly, to plant
a Christian mission in Kengtung and to serve as a corrective to
the abuses of expansionist competition between missions. Fur-
thermore, individuals on both sides made sincere efforts to live
out their convictions and to hold to those convictions even in
the face of serious adversities.

The Kengtung Question provides a perspective from which
to view the interaction between missionary principles in the con-
text of realities. It suggests that convictions and principle must
be balanced with a sense of having to live them out in real situ-
ations in a very human world. It suggests that a careful distinction
must be made between God’s call and the human perception of
that call, two very different things.

NOTES

1. Terms used by missionaries for national and ethnic groups were often
complex and sometimes contradictory. The North Laos Mission called the inhab-
itants of northern Siam the “Laos.” “Siamese” was used to refer to a resident of
central Siam, the modern day Thailand. The term “Tai” (minus the “-h”) referred
to the greater racial grouping of peoples found in Siam, eastern Burma, French
Indo-China, and southern China that included both the Siamese and the “Laos.”

2. In Burma, the term “Shan” was used in place of “Tai.” This article generally
follows missionary usages.

Baptist Chronicle, Book II, Genevieve and Eville Sowards, eds. (Rangoon: Burma

4. Annual Report of Cheung Mai Station, 1 December 1893, in Presbyterian
Church in the USA, Board of Foreign Missions, Correspondence and Reports,
Thailand, v. 22. Microfilm master at the Presbyterian Historical Society; copy at
the Manuscript Division, Payap College, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Hereafter cited as
BFM. See also McGilivray, op. cit., pp. 353-69.

5. Robert Irwin to Board, 23 November 1896, v. 13, BFM.
The Kengtung Question

29. Daniel McMillian to AIB, 18 December 1905, op. cit.; Daniel McMillian to AIB, 25 December 1907, v. 276, BFM.


31. WCD to AIB, 20 February 1906, v. 275, BFM; CRC to AIB, 12 February 1906, v. 275, BFM; WCD to Home, copy, 20 July 1906, v. 275, BFM; WCD to Friends of Kengtung Station, 20 September 1906, v. 275, BFM.

32. AIB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.

33. CRC to AIB, 25 April 1907, v. 276, BFM; CRC to AIB, 1 June 1907, v. 276, BFM; CRC to AIB, 22 June 1907, BFM; CRC to AIB, 6 August 1907, v. 276, BFM.

34. WCD to AIB, 26 April 1907, v. 276, BFM; WCD to AIB, 24 September 1907, v. 276, BFM.

35. AIB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.


38. WCD to AIB, 25 January 1910, v. 279, BFM; Dodd, Tai Race, op. cit., pp. 49-127.

39. WCD to AIB, 17 October 1919, v. 279, BFM; AIB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.

40. AIB to Laos Mission, 5 October 1911, APM; AIB to Thomas S. Barber, 5 October 1911; Report of a Sub-Committee appointed by the Committee of Reference of the Burma Mission, to consider the joint occupancy of Kengtung, 13 March 1912; W. M. Young to Laos Mission, et al., 21 March 1912; W. M. Young to AIB, 15 January 1912. All in AIB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.

41. AIB to Laos Mission, 5 June 1912, APM.

42. AIB to Robert Irwin, 30 October 1906, v. 275, BFM; S. C. Peoples to AIB, 15 October 1912, APM; AIB to S. C. Peoples, copy, 8 October 1912, APM; AIB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.


44. Robert Irwin to Board, 23 November 1906, op. cit.; Dodd, Tai Race, op. cit., p. 50; WCD to Halsey, 15 January 1910, v. 279, BFM; WCD to AIB, 27 November 1907, v. 276, BFM; WCD to AIB, 25 January 1910, v. 279, BFM.


47. Ibid., p. 95.

48. WCD to AIB, 8 February 1910, v. 279, BFM; Dodd, Tai Race, op. cit., pp. 202, 215; WCD to AIB, 10 September 1903, op. cit.


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51. Ibid.; AJB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.
52. WAB to AJB, 10 March 1899, op. cit.; WCD to AJB, 13 August 1909, op. cit.; AJB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.; WCD and CRC to A. B. Mission, Kengtung Station, 16 March 1905, op. cit.; CRC to AJB, 6 November 1905, v. 275, BFM.
53. WCD to AJB, 13 July 1906, op. cit.
54. WAB to AJB, 20 August 1903, v. 272, BFM; WCD to AJB, 4 April 1905, v. 274, BFM; WCD to AJB, 2 May 1905, v. 274, BFM; CRC, "Bazaar Work in Chiang Tung," op. cit.; AJB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.
55. AJB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.
56. WCD to AJB, 23 January 1906, v. 275, BFM.
57. See McLeish, op. cit., p. 23; Al Lun and Sowards, op. cit.; Ruth S. Young, Oral History Interview OHE 1/80, Manuscript Division, Payap College.
58. D. G. Collins to Members of the North Siam Mission, 1 September 1914, APM, Collins to WCD, 29 September 1914, APM.
59. AJB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.
60. WAB to AJB, 20 August 1903, v. 272, BFM.
61. See also WAB, Quarterly Letter to Board, 14 May 1902, v. 271, BFM.
62. WAB to AJB, 24 October 1907, v. 276, BFM.
63. CRC to AJB, 6 November 1906, v. 275, BFM; WCD and CRC to A. B. Mission, Kengtung Station, 16 March 1905, op. cit.
64. Ruth Young, op. cit.; WCD to AJB, 23 April 1904, op. cit.; WCD to AJB, 7 February 1905, op. cit.
66. Hugh Taylor to AJB, 6 January 1906, op. cit.; WCD to AJB, 28 January 1906, op. cit.
67. AJB to Laos Mission, 24 July 1913, op. cit.
68. WCD to AJB, 28 January 1908, op. cit.
69. WCD to Daniel McGilvary, 5 June 1904, op. cit.; WCD to AJB, 11 July 1904, op. cit.
70. WAB, Notes on Shan States, 20 August 1903, v. 272, BFM; WCD to Brethren of the Committee, 30 December 1904, v. 273, BFM; WCD to AJB, 7 March 1905, op. cit.; WAB to AJB, 24 October 1907, op. cit.; WCD, "Monasteries and Buddhist Cults," in Maen Research Papers, op. cit.
71. WCD to AJB, 25 January 1916, v. 279, BFM.
72. D. G. Collins to Members of the North Siam Mission, 1 September 1914, op. cit.; Collins to WCD, 29 September 1914, op. cit.